# **KEK GRID CA**

# Service Certificate Policy and Certificate Practices Statements

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Computing Research Center,

High Energy Accelerator Research Organization (KEK),

Japan

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## **Revision History Table**

Date of revision or approval by the PMA	KEK GRID CA CP and CPS	Certificate and CRL Profile	Enrollment Manual
January 17, 2006 Approved by APGRID PMA	Version: 1.0.0 CP/CPS OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.200198.1.10.2	Version: 1.0	Version: 1.0
July 7, 2006 Change in 1.3.2 and minor corrections	Version: 1.0.1 OID is not changed.		
September 26, 2007	Version: 1.10.0 CP/CPS OID: 0.2.440.200198.1.10.1.10	Version: 1.10.0	Version: 1.6
April 8, 2008	Version: 2.0.0 CP/CPS OID: 0.2.440.200198.1.10.1.2.0	Version: 2.0.0	Version: 1.7
April 13, 2009 correction of typos	Version 2.0.1 OID is not changed	Version: 2.0.1	Version: 1.7
Jun 11, 2009 change operations	Version 2.0.2 OID is not changed	Version: 2.0.2	Version: 1.7
Oct 8, 209 Update CP and change CP/CPS OID	Version 2.1.0 CP/CPS OID: 0.2.440.200198.1.10.1.2.1	Version : 2.1.0	Version: 1.7

#### 1. Introduction

Computing Research Center of High Energy Accelerator Research Organization (KEK), Japan, operates a Certification Authority called KEK GRID Certification Authority (CA) for Grid PKI services. Structured according to RFC 2527 [1], this document describes policy and practices of KEK GRID CA services. Not all sections of RFC2527 are used. Sections that are not included have a default value of "No stipulation". This document describes the set of rules and procedures established by the KEK GRID CA Policy Management Authority for the operations of the KEK GRID CA.

#### 1.1 Overview

This document will include both the Certificate Policy and the Certification Practices Statement for the KEK GRID CA. It is the intent of the KEK GRID CA to issue Identity and server certificates for use in Grids. These certificates are for KEK researchers and their colleagues. These certificates will be compatible with the Globus middleware that are used on these Grids. The KEK GRID CA is based on NAREGI (National Research GRID Initiative) Certificate Management System

## 1.1.1 Type of Certificates

KEK GRID CA issues following types of certificates.

- ✓ Clients for identification
- ✓ Globus servers
- ✓ Web servers

#### 1.1.2 Related specification

None

#### 1.2 Identification

KEK GRID CA uses following identifiers to identity this document and certificate policies.

Table1-1 OIDs

OID	Object
0.2.440.200198	KEK( High Energy Accelerator Research
	Organization)
0.2.440.200198.1	KEK Computing Research Center (CRC)
0.2.440.200198.1.10	KEK Computing Research Center CA
0.2.440.200198.1.10.1.2.1	Certification Practices Statements
0.2.440.200198.1.10.2	CA Certificate Policy (CP)
0.2.440.200198.1.10.2.1	Globus Server CP

0.2.440.200198.1.10.2.2	Globus Clients CP
0.2.440.200198.1.10.2.3	Web Server CP

## 1.3 Community and Applicability

User certificates can be used to authenticate a person to relying sites that have agreed to accept certificates from the KEK GRID CA. It is expected that these sites will be collaborating with KEK. Server certificates can be used to identify a named service on a specific host. These certificates may be used to authenticate the servers to another Grid entity.

#### 1.3.1 Organization

#### (1) Policy Management Authority

The decision relates to the management of KEK GRID CA will be performed by the coordinate committee called "KEK GRID Policy Management Authority (KEK GRID PMA)", which consists of representatives of Computing Research Center and Information Security Office of KEK.

The KEK GRID PMA will be responsible for:

- Draft and approve CP/CPS,
- Take countermeasure for compromise of the Certificate Authority(CA)'s private key,
- Take countermeasure for Emergency operations in disaster,
- Other Important matters.

#### (2) Operating Organization

Fig. 1-2 and Table 1-2 show organization and system configuration of the CA.




Fig.1-2 Organization and System Configuration

Table 1-2 Organization of operating CA and roles

	Main role	
Security Officer	•administrates all tasks on the CA system including the CA private key	
RA Operator	·creates users ids and distribute them	
CA operator	·maintains the CA system	
Helpdesk	·contact point for users about CA operation	
User administrator	·accepts user enrollment	
	•examines user information and approve the user	
Certificate user	<ul> <li>•a user using a certificate issued by KEK GRID CA</li> </ul>	
Host administrator	•an administrator of a host using a certificate issued by KEK GRID CA	

#### 1.3.2 Applicability

It is assumed that certificates issued by KEK GRID CA have to be used in the following purposes and must not be used for any other purposes.

Table 1-3 Certificates and its purpose

Туре		Purpose
Client certificates	:	Client authentication under the GRID computing environments(SSL)
Server	Globus Servers	Globus server authentication
certificates	LCG and gLite information Servers*	Server authentication (SSL)

<sup>\*</sup>Only one server in every LCG(LHC Computing GRID) or gLite sites.

#### 1.4 Contact details

#### 1.4.1 Specification administration organization

The KEK GRID PMA has responsibility for administrating the KEK GRID PKI services.

#### 1.4.2 Contact information

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#### 1.4.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

The KEK GRID PMA has responsibility for determining CPS suitability for the policy.

#### 2. GENERAL PROVISIONS

## 2.1 Obligation

#### 2.1.1 Certification Authority obligation

The CA will:

- · Create and manage the CA's private key under secure environment.
- Issue end entity certificates based on enrollment information forwarded from the Registration Authority (RA).
- · Revoke users' certificates and issue a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) based

- on request forwarded from the RA.
- Publish a CRL and certificate related information on a repository called KEK GRID CA repository quickly.
- · Identify which CP/CPS was used to issue certificates.
- Make a reasonable effort to make sure that end entities realize the importance of properly protecting their private data.

#### 2.1.2 Registration Authority obligation

The RA will:

- Approve user administrators of the operating organization (KEK)
- Issue Users IDs and deliver them to the user administrators.
- Forward enrollment request to the CA after the validity check using User IDs and password.
- Receive revocation requests from end entities, authenticate the origin of the request, and send revocation request to the CA.
- · Subscribe certificates to users in securely and correctly.
- · Archive enrollment information in secure state.

#### 2.1.3 End entity, host administrator obligation

Certificate users and host administrators shall undertake the following obligations:

- · Present correct information at the enrollment.
- Procedures for the enrollment and key creation have to be carried based on the document "KEK GRID CA Enrollment Procedure Document".
- Use the certificate exclusively for authorized and legal purposes, consistent with this Policy.
- Manage a certificate and its private key securely. It must not be used by other people. Protect the pass-phrase (private key) from others and the pass phrase must be at least 12 characters long.
- Instruct the CA to revoke the certificate promptly upon any actual or suspected loss, disclosure, or other compromise of the subscribers private key.
- Instruct the CA to revoke the certificate when leaving the organization.
- · Any user certificates must not be shared.
- · Each host certificate must be linked to a single network entity.

#### 2.1.4 Relying party obligation

- · Check validity of certificates and certificate chains. Issues to be checked include:
  - ✓ The certificates shall not be modified,
  - ✓ Within validity dates,
  - ✓ Checking trust CA signature,
  - ✓ The certificate is not revoked.

#### 2.1.5 User administrator obligation

User administrator will:

 Accept certified users including host administrators, examine requests based on user information which is previously registered, and approve the enrollment.

## 2.1.6 Repository obligation

KEK GRID CA repository will;

- Publish information specified in this CPS[2.6.1 Publication] and for enabling users to retrieve certificates information and CRL from the KEK GRID CA repository,
- Make efforts to operate within specified time in this CPS[2.6.2 Frequency of publication].
- Protect registered information adequately
- The KEK GRID CA repository will run on a best-effort basis, with an intended availability of 24x7.

## 2.2 Liability

#### 2.2.1 CA liability

KEK GRID CA has liability:

- To issue the certificate based on the enrollment information forwarded from the RA
- To revoke the certificate based on the request forwarded from the RA.
- To register and publish client certificate information and a CRL except in time of temporary suspension such as system maintenance or in other emergent case.
- To perform practices on the procedures based on this document and have authenticity for issued certificates. KEK GRID CA does not have liability for modification of certificates by the malicious person or compromise of signature algorithm such as discovery of attack.
- To perform practices based on this document adequately so that the private key is not compromised by theft or lost.

#### 2.2.2 RA liability

KEK GRID CA has a liability:

- To send user enrollment request to the CA correctly
- · To send user revocation request to the CA quickly.
- To perform practices based on the document to protect unauthorized access or modification to confidential information contained in enrollment requests.

#### 2.2.3 Certificate Users and host administrators liability

Certificate users and host administrators have liability to protect certificates and private key from compromise by theft and lost thread

## 2.2.4 Relying party liability

No Stipulation

#### 2.2.5 User administrator liability

User administrator has a liability to ensure that enrollment information to KEK GRID CA is correct.

#### 2.2.6 Repository liability

KEK GRID CA repository has a liability

- To response to retrieve requests within operating time defined in this document.
- Not to have a liability that the stored CRL is not the latest one at the time of the retrieval request.

## 2.3 Financial responsibility

KEK GRID CA assumes no financial responsibility with respect to use or management of any issued certificate.

## 2.4 Interpretation and Enforcement

Interpretation of this CP and CPS is according to Japanese laws.

#### 2.5 Fees

No fees are charged for KEK GRID CA Certificates.

## 2.6 Publication and repository

#### 2.6.1 Publication

Following information will be published on the KEK GRID CA repository operated by KEK CRC

- · Client certificate information used for GRID map file
- A CRL issued by KEK GRID CA
- · The CA's certificate
- · The CA's certificate's fingerprint
- · The CA's signing policy file
- · A copy of this policy
- Other information deemed relevant to the KEK GRID CA

## 2.6.2 Frequency of publication

- Certificates information will be published to the KEK GRID CA repository as soon as issued.
- · CRLs will be published as soon as issued or refreshed on scheduled update
- All KEK GRID CA documents will be published to the KEK GRID CA repository as they are updated and changes to this CP and CPS will be published as soon as they are approved and previous versions will remain available on-line

#### 2.6.3 Access control

Information specified in this document [CPS2.6.1] is accessible through KEK network under adequate access control.

#### 2.6.4 Repository

 Information specified in this document [CPS2.6.1] is stored in the KEK GRID CA repository and accessible from KEK network.

#### 2.7 Compliance audit

#### 2.7.1 Frequency of Entity Compliance Audit

The KEK GRID CA will accept at least one external audit a year.

In addition, the KEK GRID CA performs a self-audit of the staffs for CA and RA at least once per year according to this document.

#### 2.7.2 Identity/Qualifications of Auditor

The CA will be audited by other cross-certifying CAs.

#### 2.7.3 Auditor's Relationship to Audited Party

Desirable auditors are third-parties to the KEK GRID CA.

## 2.7.4 Topics Covered by Audit

The audit will focus on whether operation of the KEK GRID CA is compliant to this document and the Minimum CA Requirements specified by the Asia Pacific Grid Policy Management Authority.

#### 2.7.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

The KEK GRID PMA will decide the necessary actions identified in the audit and submit the report to the auditor in timely manner.

#### 2.7.6 Communications of Results Frequency of Entity Compliance

The result of the audit will be informed to the KEK GRID CA operation staffs. The KEK GRID PMA releases the results to policy management authorities of their cross-certifying CAs according to necessity.

## 2.8 Confidentiality

#### 2.8.1 Types of information to be kept confidential

Except explicit information specified in CPS [2.6.1 Publication], all related information will be treated as confidential. Confidential information will not be provided to any other people. Confidential information including documents and electronic media will be stored securely by the KEK Grid Security Officer.

#### 2.8.2 Types of information not considered confidential

Information specified in CPS[2.6.1 Publication] is not confidential information in this system.

#### 2.8.3 Disclosure of certificate revocation/suspension information

It is published that revocation date and reason when the certificate is revoked by the CA. It is not confidential information but other detailed information will not be published.

#### 2.8.4 Release to law enforcement officials

No Stipulation

#### 2.8.5 Release as part of civil discovery

No Stipulation

## 2.8.6 Disclosure upon owner's request

Following information will be disclosed after the owner will be authenticated.

- · Contents of the certificate
- · Certificate Status

#### 2.8.7 Other information release circumstances

No Stipulation

#### 2.9 Intellectual Property Rights

KEK GRID CA does not claim any intellectual property rights on issued certificates. Parts of this document are inspired by CP/CPS documents of CERN CA[2], GridCanada CA[3], ASGC CA[4], NAREGI CA[5] and AIST CA0.

#### 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

#### 3.1 Initial Registration

#### 3.1.1 Type of names

Name components vary depending on the type of certificate. Names will be consistent with the name requirements specified in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL profile" (RFC 2459[7]). See section 7 for more details.

## 3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

The Subject Name in a certificate must have a reasonable association with the authenticated name of the entity.

#### 3.1.3 Rules for interpreting various name forms

See section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.

#### 3.1.4 Uniqueness of names

The Distinguished Name must be unique for each subject name certified by the KEK GRID CA. Each CN component will include the full name of the subscriber.

For hosts and services the CN must contain the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the host.

Certificates must apply to unique individuals or resources. Users must not share certificates

#### 3.1.5 Name claim dispute resolution procedure

No stipulation

#### 3.1.6 Recognition, authentication and role of trademarks

No stipulation

#### 3.1.7 Method to prove possession of private key

No stipulation

#### 3.1.8Authentication of organization identity

The RA verifies the organization identity as member of a recognized organization by the KEK GRID CA.

## 3.1.9 Authentication of individual identity

The KEK GRID CA verifies the identify of a person by

- The person must be an existing user of KEK CRC. *i.e.* The person must have an account on either of the KEK CRC computing facilities.
  - One referee among KEK employees is requested
  - Applicants must be a member of either of the projects at KEK
- A copy of his/her personal identification document a photo must be attached to his/her request.
- A KEK staff in the position of RA will verify the identification by meeting him/her in person. For those who have a proper reason why they cannot show up at the RA office, an interview on the TV conference system can be substitutable with the process.

#### 3.2 Routine Rekey

Rekeying of certificates can be requested by an online procedure, which checks the validity of certificates. KEK Grid CA does not allow re-new of end entity certificates, therefore users must use re-key procedure. A KEK staff in the position of RA will verify the identification.

## 3.3 Rekey After Revocation

Rekey after revocation follows the same rules as an initial registration as described in the section 3.1

## 3.4 Revocation Request

When revocation of a certificate is requested to the KEK GRID CA, the user identity and organization shall be verified as when issuing a certificate according to section 3.1 of this document.

#### 3.5 CA's transition procedure

KEK CA has the below planed procedure about transition of the CA's cryptographic data.

- (1) KEK GRID CA changes key for responding the signing request of end-entity new certificates.
- (2) KEK GRID CA continues to use the old key only for revoking certificates and the signing CRL updates.
- (3) After the CA's key is changed, KEK GRID CA system continues to provide two ca certifications and to update two CRLs which are signed by current key and by new key respectively through CA's web site.
- (4) After old CA certificate will be expired, KEK GRID CA system will terminate to provide ca certificate and CRL signed by old key.

#### 4. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

This chapter describes requirements for user certificates and server certificates, not defined for CA self-signed certificate.

#### 4.1 Certificate application

(1) certificate application

Users must submit an application form to the KEK GRID RA by paper documents. User administrator of the KEK GRID RA examines the request according to this document [3.1.9 Authentication of individual identity]. If the application is approved,

then the KEK GRID RA will inform the KEK GRID CA that the request has been approved. Paper documents are brought by hand from the KEK GRID RA to the KEK GRID CA. Then, the KEK GRID CA will issue a user name (10 digits random characters) and a password (10 digits random characters are provided and minimum 10 digits are requested when a user change) which will be used for obtaining a certificate from the CA server on-line. The issued user name and password are recorded on the paper and sent to the applicant by mail or FAX. Detailed procedure for certificate application is described in "KEK GRID CA Enrollment Manual" which is available on the KEK GRID CA repository.

#### (2) certificate enrollment

Users need to create a key pair on user's machine according to the procedures described in "KEK GRID CA Enrollment Manual", then send a certificate signing request which contains the public key to the RA server on-line. Communication path to this enrollment is encrypted using SSL. Detailed instruction for certificate enrollment is described in "KEK GRID CA Enrollment Manual" which is available on the KEK GRID CA repository.

#### 4.2 Certificate Issuance

Users are provided an enrollment tool which supports creation of key pairs, making CSR, and LCMP (Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol) which provides communication protocol between KEK GRID CA and the users.

#### 4.2.1 Receipt Certificate enrollment

RA will execute the following steps after receipt of user certificate request.

- prompt the user to input the user name and password
- · Verify the user name and password
- Accept enrollment information which will be subject information in the certificate.
- Send the certificate signing request to the CA server using secure connection.
   That is dedicated to the connection between the RA server and the CA server.

#### 4.2.2 Issuance Certificate

The CA server will issue a certificate signed with the CA private key and the user's public key for the issue request received from the RA server.

#### 4.2.3 Subscribe Certificate

Users receive the certificates thorough RA server.

## 4.3 Certificate Acceptance

User and host administrator will register the certificate to the certificate stores based on the user's operational document.

#### 4.4 Certificate Suspension and Revocation

The procedure for revocation requests from a user or revocation from the CA can, as for certificate enrollment, be done on-line using the Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (LCMP), or the web enrollment functions provided in standard Windows environments. All communications are encrypted.

#### 4.4.1 Circumstances for revocation

In any of the following circumstances, a certificate will be revoked due to a user request, or by the CA.

- · The user's key is compromised or suspected of being compromised.
- · The user information in the certificate is suspected of being incorrect.
- The user violates his/her obligations, as specified in section 2.1.3 End entity, host administrator obligation of this CPS.
- The CA private key is suspected of being compromised.
- · When the use of the certificate will stop (including resignation of the user, etc.).
- · The CA private key is compromised.

#### 4.4.2 Who can request revocation

Subscribers, the KEK GRID RA and the KEK GRID CA can request revocation.

#### 4.4.3 Procedure for revocation request

Users will send revocation request based on the operational document provided when revocation circumstances occur. RA server will authenticate the requester as described in this document [3.4 Revocation Request]. Then RA server sends revocation request to CA server. The CA server will revoke the certificate and update the signed CRL on the KEK GRID CA repository.

When a certificate is revoked, the owner of the certificate will be notified the revocation by Email.

## 4.4.4 Revocation request grace period

The KEK GRID CA processes revocation as soon as it receives the request. The revocation information will be published to the KEK GRID CA repository.

## 4.4.5 Circumstances for suspension

The KEK GRID CA does not support Certificate Suspension.

#### 4.4.6 Who can request suspension

The KEK GRID CA does not support Certificate Suspension.

#### 4.4.7 Procedure for suspension request

The KEK GRID CA does not support Certificate Suspension.

## 4.4.8 Limits on suspension period

The KEK GRID CA does not support Certificate Suspension.

#### 4.4.9 CRL issuance frequency

The KEK GRID CA refreshes CRL and published it to the KEK GRID CA repository according to the revocation requests and the expiration of the CRL. CRL validity term is shown in table 4-1.

KEK GRID CA issues a new CRL immediately after a revocation or at least 7 days before expiration.

Table 4-1 CRL Issuance interval

	CRL
Issuer CA	KEK GRID CA
CRL validity	30days

#### 4.4.10 CRL checking requirements

Relying party verifies the certificate by retrieving the newest CRL from the KEK GRID CA repository.

#### 4.4.11 On-line revocation/status checking availability

No stipulation

#### 4.4.12 On-line revocation checking requirements

No stipulation

#### 4.4.13 Other forms of revocation advertisements available

No stipulation

## 4.4.14 Checking requirements for other forms of revocation advertisements

No stipulation

## 4.5 Security Audit Procedures

The KEK GRID CA will retain records as much as possible so that the KEK GRID CA could trace anything if something illegal would happen. Such audit information is not publicly available. Auditors are allowed to access to the information as part of auditing and such information must be kept confidential.

## 4.5.1 Types of event recorded

The following information will be recorded by the KEK GRID CA. For each record, the event type, date and time, and occurrence information (system name, operations staff name, etc.) will be included.

- CA Server log
- · CA Server access log
- · Certificate and CRL issue and revocation log
- Error log
- OS Login, Logout, Reboot log
- RA Server log
- · CRL Publisher activity log
- CRL Publisher error log
- RA Server access log
- · Certificate issue, revocation log
- Error log
- · OS Login, Logout, Reboot log
- HSM log
- Token access log
- · Machine room work record
- · Key sign-out journal

## 4.5.2 Frequency of processing log

No stipulation

## 4.5.3 Retention period for audit log

The minimum retention period is three years.

## 4.5.4 Protection of audit log

Access logs and System logs are protected by the authorization mechanism provided by UNIX operating system. Only the owners of such logs are able to modify the logs. Access logs and System logs are periodically back-up to the removable media which

is stored in a lockable cabinet when it is off-line. For logs of physical access to the CA room, each paper sheet is signed by the User Administrator and is assigned a unique serial number. Filled paper sheets and access logs to the CA room are stored in a lockable cabinet.

#### 4.5.5 Audit log backup procedures

CA operators will obtain each type of log recorded by the CA server and other systems on external media weekly, and store them monthly.

#### 4.5.6 Audit collection system

No stipulation

## 4.5.7 Notification to event-causing subject

No stipulation

#### 4.5.8 Vulnerability assessments

No stipulation

#### 4.6 Records Archival

## 4.6.1 Types of event recorded

The KEK GRID CA will store the following archive data. Documents will be stored by including all versions and their revision history.

- All certificates and the CRL issued by the KEK GRID CA
- All enrollments submitted by users and any notifications sent to users
- A record of any work done related to the CA key
- The audit logs as specified in section 4.5.1 Types of event recorded of this CPS
- Conformance audit and security audit records
- Certificate use rules and guides provided to users
- This document and operational procedures documents
- Other important materials related to decisions of the KEK GRID CA PMA

## 4.6.2 Retention period for archive

Archived data will be stored for three years. In addition, the identity validation records will be kept as long as there are valid certificates based on such a validation.

#### 4.6.3 Protection of archive

Section 4.5.4 of this document specifies how the archive logs are to be protected.

Archival data will be protected in a lockable cabinet with appropriate entry control, and the CA operator will manage sign-out of the cabinet key.

## 4.6.4 Archive backup procedures

The electronic part of the archive is done by daily backup on a removable media. The paper-based archives are stored in a lockable cabinet at KEK.

## 4.6.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records

All on-line archives are time-stamped using a host clock that is synchronized with NTP. Date and time are recorded in the paper-based archives manually.

## 4.6.6 Archive collection system

No stipulation

## 4.6.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

No stipulation

## 4.7 Key changeover

## 4.7.1 User certificate validity date

Each User certificates have to be re-issued in following validity term.

Table 4-3 user certificate validity

	Туре	Validity
Client certificate		1 year
Server certificate	Globus servers	1 year
	Web servers	1 year

## 4.7.2 CA certificate validity

The CA will stop to sign new user certificates by its private key before its validity is shorter than user certificates. CA certificate validity is 10 years.

Table4-4 CA certificate validity

Туре	Validity
KEK GRID CA	10 years

## 4.8 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

#### 4.8.1 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted

If it is detected that hardware, software or data are corrupted or damaged, it is necessary to recover the system by backed up data immediately.

## 4.8.2 CA Private key is compromised

If it is suspected that CA private key is compromised, perform revocation based on the CPS and re-build the new KEK GRID CA system.

- Terminate PKI service if HSM (Hardware Security Module) is stolen or operational-key is lost, and announce the fact to all related persons.
- Revoke all certificates so that any relying party does not trust the CA.
- If a person in charge of all CA system management decides that it is difficult to
  use the same private key continuity, revoke the CA certificate by the key. After
  recognition secure circumstances for CA system, re-create a key pair and
  re-build the CA system.

## 4.8.3 Secure facility after a natural or other type of disaster

According to [4.8.1].

## 4.9 CA Termination

The KEK GRID CA will inform any related parties ahead of time regarding termination of the CA operations and preservation of related backup data, etc., before the prescribed procedures for termination are carried out.

#### 5. PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS

## 5.1 Physical Controls

#### 5.1.1 Site location and construction

The KEK GRID CA system will be located where it is not easily susceptible to damage from water exposure, earthquake, fire or other disasters. It will be constructed to be earthquake and fire resistant, and with safety measures to prevent unauthorized entry. A safe location shall also be provided to protect CA machinery from damage or unauthorized entry.

#### 5.1.2 Physical access

The room, in which the CA server is located, is locked by a mechanical lock and physical access to the room is restricted to explicitly authorized person documented in

[5.2 Procedural Controls] given by KEK GRID CA Security Officer. A CA operator is not allowed to enter the room alone and need to enter the room with the other CA operator. If a CA operator needs to enter the room alone, he must notify the fact to the Security Officer by an E-mail before and after entering the room. All events about the access to the room must be recorded in the paper sheets prepared in the room. The events include the names of CA operators, date and time of entering/leaving the room, and the purpose of the access to the room. The filled sheets will be kept in a safe box.

#### 5.1.3 Power and air conditioning

The power for the server machines are taken from the uninterruptible power supply (UPS).

The machine room is equipped with adequate air conditioning to maintain a comfortable environment for the CA server and other devices, and for the CA staff to perform their duties.

#### 5.1.4 Water exposures

No special countermeasure.

#### 5.1.5 Earthquake and protection

A building is earthquake resistant construction and has countermeasures against equipment to fall down.

#### 5.1.6 Fire prevention and protection

A building is fire-resistant construction and the room is fire prevention cell with fire protection.

#### 5.1.7 Media storage

Media will be stored in the lockable cabinet in the room where adequate access control is done.

#### 5.1.8 Waste disposal

It is according to adequate waste disposal process for the document or media containing confidential information.

#### 5.2 Procedural Controls

#### 5.2.1 Trusted roles

Staff is assigned trusted roles as defined in the section 1.3 of the document.

## 5.2.2 Number of persons required per task

Organization of the KEK GRID CA is described in this document [1.3.1 Organization] and number of persons for each task is described in this section. KEK GRID CA service is operated by:

- · Two Security Officers
- · Two RA Operators
- · Two CA Operators
- · One User Administrator.

No one works for different tasks, i.e. The KEK GRID CA service is operated by seven staffs. Besides these staffs, four other staffs in Help Desk of KEK Computing Research Center will work as help desk staffs of the CA.

#### 5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role

The system will identify and authenticate the operator when the staff operates the system.

#### **5.3 Personnel Controls**

All of personnel controls are according to the other document.

## 5.3.1 Background check procedures

The role of the CA requires a well trained person who is familiar with the PKI and technically competent. There are no background checks.

#### 5.3.2 Training requirements

No stipulation

## 5.3.3 Retraining frequency and requirements

No stipulation

## 5.3.4 Job rotation frequency and sequence

No stipulation

#### 5.3.5 Sanctions for unauthorized actions

No stipulation

#### 5.3.6 Contracting personnel requirements

No stipulation

## 5.3.7 Documentation supplied to personnel

The KEK GRID CA provides internal instruction manual for personnel.

#### **6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

## 6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

## 6.1.1 Key pair generation

(1) CA key

A CA key pair is generated using Hardware Security Module (HSM) by the Security Officer.

(2) End Entity key

User key pairs are generated by software on each user terminal at the time of enrollment.

#### 6.1.2 Private key delivery to entity

The system does not deliver an end entity private key since the key is generated at the end entity.

## 6.1.3 Public key delivery to CA

End entity will send its public key included in CSR at time of certificate enrollment.

## 6.1.4 CA public key delivery to users

CA certificate will be published on the KEK GRID CA repository.

#### 6.1.5 Key sizes

Table 6-1 shows the key algorithm and length for each key.

Table6-1Algorithm and key length

type		Algorithm and key length
CA key		SHA1 with RSA 2048bit
End entity	Client	SHA1 with RSA 1024bit
key	Server	SHA1 with RSA 1024bit

## 6.1.6 Public key parameters generation

No stipulation

#### 6.1.7 Parameter quality checking

No stipulation

#### 6.1.8 Hardware/software key generation

As defined in this document [6.1.1 Key pair generation].

## 6.1.9 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

A private key for end entity is used for digital signature, non repudiation, key encipherment, and data encipherment. This purpose will be set in the extension field of "keyusage" of the certificate.

## **6.2 Private Key Protection**

#### 6.2.1 Standards for cryptographic module

The CA private key is protected by HSM compliant with FIPS140-2 Level3.

## 6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

The CA's private key is not under (n out of m) multi-person control. But the KEK GRID CA implements multi-person control for the access to the CA server as described in this document [5.1.2 Physical access]. Backup copy of the CA's private key is under (2 out of 3) multi-person control.

#### 6.2.3 Private key escrow

Not perform

#### 6.2.4 Private key backup

#### (1) Private key backup

The private key will be backed up into a token in secure places where access is controlled. Back-up is made by the CA operators and the Security Officer.

- (2) End entity private key back upIt remains users to private key back up and management.
- (3) Pass phase of the CA private key back up

  The pass phrase of the CA private key will be kept in sealed envelope. The

  KEK Grid PMA staff will keep this sealed envelope in a safe place.

#### 6.2.5 Private key archival

CA private key is not archived.

## 6.2.6 Private key entry into cryptographic module

The CA private key is created in the HSM and securely stored by the Security Officer with the CA operator. The CA private key is protected with a pass phrase of at least 15 characters. The pass phrase is known by only the Security Officer and the CA operators. End Entity private key is created according to "KEK GRID CA Enrollment Manual" which is available on the KEK GRID CA repository. It needs approval by the Security Officer and must be under multi-person control to register the CA private key recovered from back up media.

#### 6.2.7 Method of activating private key

The CA private key in HSM will be activated by a Security Officer or a CA operator.

#### 6.2.8 Method of deactivating private key

The CA private key becomes deactivate in the server by a Security Officer.

## 6.2.9 Method of destroying private key

No stipulation

#### **6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management**

## 6.3.1 Public key archival

No stipulation

#### 6.3.2 Usage periods for the public and private keys

Usage periods for the public and private keys depend on this CPS [4.7.1 User certificate validity date] and [4.7.2 CA certificate validity].

#### 6.4 Activation Data

## 6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

Activation of data consists of physical keys and pass phrase. It is input by a Security Officer or a CA Operator. Physical access to the CA server is described in this document [5.1.2 Physical access].

## 6.4.2 Activation data protection

Pass phrase as activation data will be protected for usage and modification defined in the other rule.

## 6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data

No stipulation

## **6.5 Computer Security Controls**

## 6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

CA server is dedicated to the CA operation.

## 6.5.2 Computer security rating

No stipulation

## 6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

## 6.6.1 System development controls

No stipulation

## 6.6.2 Security management controls

No stipulation

## 6.6.3 Life cycle security ratings

No stipulation

#### **6.7 Network Security Controls**

The CA Server and the RA Server will be on line and appropriately protected by

firewall. It is securely protected from wrong penetration access except for access to the KEK GRID CA repository and communication path between RA and CA.

## **6.8 Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls**

No stipulation

#### 7. CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES

The CRL of KEK Grid CA is compliant with RFC3280.

#### 7.1 Certificate Profile

Certificate profile is described in a separate document, "KEK GRID CA Certificate and CRL Profile version 2.0". The document is available on the KEK GRID CA repository.

#### 7.2 CRL Profile

CRL profile is described in a separate document, "KEK GRID CA Certificate and CRL Profile version 2.0". The document is available on the KEK GRID CA repository.

#### 8. SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION

#### 8.1 Specification change procedures

The KEK GRID PMA will change this document by necessity. Revision is made and approved by the KEK GRID PMA. Minor editorial changes to this document can be made without approval by the KEK GRID PMA. New OID will not be assigned to the revised document when such minor changes would be made. Substantial changes in policy or changes in the technical security controls need to be approved by the KEK GRID PMA. New OID will be assigned to the revised document for such substantial changes would be made.

## 8.2 Publication and notification policies

For minor editorial changes, revision to this document will be announced on the KEK GRID CA repository. Substantial changes will be notified by E-mails to all relevant relying parties, all cross-certifying CAs, and the PMAs in which the KEK GRID CA participates. These changes will also be announced on the KEK GRID CA repository.

# 8.3 CPS approval procedures

All major changes must be approved by the KEK GRID PMA. Change logs are described in Appendix A of this document.

## 9. Glossary

#### Certification Authority (CA)

The entity / system that issues X.509 identity certificates (places a subject name and public key in a document and then digitally signs that document using the private key of the CA).

#### Certificates – or Public Key Certificates

A data structure containing the public key of an end entity and some other information, which is digitally signed with the private key of the CA that issued it

#### Certificate Policy (CP)

A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements. For example, a particular certificate policy might indicate applicability of a type of certificate to the authentication of electronic data interchange transactions for the trading of goods within a given price range.

#### Certification Practice Statement (CPS)

A statement of the practices, which a certification authority employs in issuing certificates.

#### Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)

A CRL is a time stamped list identifying revoked certificates that is signed by a CA and made freely available in a public repository.

#### **End Entity**

A certificate subject that does not sign certificates (i.e., person, host, and service certificates).

#### **FIPS**

American Federal Information Processing Standards Publication. FIPS140-2 is a standard for evaluating cryptographic modules.

#### **Host Certificate**

A certificate for server certification and encryption of communications (SSL/TSL). It will represent a single machine

#### gLite

The name of Middleware developed in European Union

#### LHC.

Large Hardon Collider, the facility at CERN, Switzerland

#### LCG

LCG stands for LHC Computing GRID, and is the name of the project and it's middleware. The LCG middleware is based on gLite.

#### Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

A term generally used to describe the laws, policies, standards, and software that regulate or manipulate certificates and public and private keys. All of this implies a set of standards for applications that use encryption.

#### Person Certificate

A certificate used for authentication to establish a Grid Person Identity. It will represent an individual person.

## **Policy Qualifier**

The policy-dependent information that accompanies a certificate policy identifier in an X.509 certificate.

#### **Private Key**

In a PKI, a cryptographic key created and kept private by a subscriber. It may be used to make digital signatures which may be verified by the corresponding public key; to decrypt the message encrypted by the corresponding public key; or, with other information, to compute a piece of common shared secret information.

#### **Public Key**

In a PKI, a cryptographic key created and made public by a subscriber. It may be used to encrypt information that may be decrypted by the corresponding private key; or to verify the digital signature made by the corresponding private key.

#### Registration Authority (RA)

An entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of certificate subjects, but that does not sign or issue certificates (i.e., an RA is delegated certain tasks on behalf of a CA).

#### **Relying Party**

A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on that certificate and/or digital signatures verified using that certificate.

#### Service Certificate

A certificate for a particular service running on a host. It will represent a single service on a single host.

#### Subscriber

In the case of certificates issued to resources (such as web servers), the person responsible for the certificate for that resource. For certificates issued to individuals, same as certificate subject.

#### Virtual Organization (VO)

An organization that has been created to represent a particular research or development effort independent of the physical sites at which the scientist or engine

#### Appendix A. Change Logs

- Version 0.3 to Version 1.0
  - •Major revision according to the minimum CA requirement of APGRID PMA

#### References:

- [1] S. Chokani and W. Ford, Internet X.509 Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, RFC 2527. March 1999.
- [2] CERN Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement, Document OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.96.10.1.2.3, November 8, 2004.
- [3] Grid Canada Certificate Policy and Certification Policy Statement, Document OID:2.16.124.101.1.274.47.1.1, December 20, 2002.
- [4] Academia Sinica Grid Computing Certification Authority (ASGCCA) Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement, OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.5935.10.1.1.1, June 2003.
- [5] NAREGI Certificate Practice Statement Ver1.0.1, OID 1.2.392.00200181.1.1, September 27, 2005
- [6] AIST GRID PKI Service Certificate Policy and Certificate Practice Statements Ver.1.1.1,CP OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.18936.1.11.2 and CPS OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.18936.1.11.1, June 15,2005
- [7] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk and D. Solo, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile, RFC2459, January 1999.